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Idioms are used in conventional language twice as frequently as metaphors, but
most research, particularly recent work on embodiment has focused on the latter.
However, idioms have the potential to significantly deepen our understanding of
embodiment because their meanings cannot be derived from their component words.
To determine whether sensorimotor states could activate idiomatic meaning, participants
were instructed to engage in postures/actions reflecting various idioms (e.g., sticking your
neck out) relative to non-idiomatic control postures/actions while reading and responding
to statements designed to assess idiomatic meaning. The results showed that statements
were generally more strongly endorsed after idiom embodiment than control conditions,
indicating that the meaning of idiomatic expressions may not be as disconnected from
perceptual and motor experiences than previously thought. These findings are discussed
in terms of the mirror neuron system and the necessity of pluralistic contributions from
both sensorimotor and amodal linguistic systems to fully account for the representation
and processing of idioms and other figurative expressions.
Keywords: idiom, metaphor, embodiment, amodal symbols, perceptual symbols, mirror neurons
INTRODUCTION
Across cultures, languages are rich with figurative expressions
that frequently occur when people communicate. For instance,
English speakers are estimated to utter approximately 10 million
novel metaphors and about 20 million idioms over their life-
time (Cooper, 1999). A metaphor involves identifying a connec-
tion between otherwise dissimilar conceptual domains (Hoffman,
1984; Lakoff, 1993; Katz, 1996; Gentner et al., 2001), as illustrated
in sentences like Mary’s personality is a magnet, or Mary’s mind
was a whirlpool; whereas idioms are expressions whose mean-
ing cannot be derived from a systematic or literal processing of
the component words (Fraser, 1970; Swinney and Cutler, 1979;
Libben and Titone, 2008; Vespignani et al., 2010). For example,
Mary could be sticking her neck out when she sneaks out of her
parents’ home to attend a late-night party or sitting on the fence
about who to vote for in the upcoming class election, and the
meaning of the individual words does not enable us to understand
these idiomatic expressions.
Since the metaphorical link to the origin of their meaning has
been lost or is no longer evident, idioms were initially thought to
be dead or frozenmetaphors (Katz, 1973; Gibbs, 1994; Keysar and
Bly, 1999; Jackendoff, 2002; Caillies and Declerq, 2011). Indeed,
the similarities and differences in how metaphors and idioms are
understood has been the subject of considerable debate (Cacciari,
1993; Katz, 1996; Sanford, 2008; Caillies and Declerq, 2011), par-
ticularly since some evidence suggests that idiom comprehension
is at least partly based on the activation of underlying conceptual
metaphors (Gibbs and O’Brien, 1990; Gibbs et al., 1997; Sanford,
2008; but see Glucksberg et al., 1993; McGlone, 1996; Keysar and
Bly, 1999). Research has also shown that idioms and how they
are processed can vary according to their transparency and com-
positionality (Titone and Connine, 1999; Caillies and Butcher,
2007; Libben and Titone, 2008). Although it is no longer correct
to consider idioms as dead metaphors (Gibbs, 1993), it is gen-
erally accepted that they are indeed a distinct type of figurative
expression whose representation and processing differs from that
of metaphors (Cacciari, 1993; Glucksberg et al., 1993; Giora and
Fein, 1999; Caillies and Declerq, 2011).
Interestingly, even though idioms are used in conventional
language twice as frequently as metaphors according to the pre-
viously provided estimate, most research has been focused on
metaphors, as evidenced by a standard PSYC INFO search yield-
ing over 11 timesmore hits for metaphors than idioms. However,
despite the fact that metaphors have been studied to a substan-
tially greater extent than idioms, there has still been a considerable
amount of research investigating how idioms are represented and
processed (e.g., Gibbs, 1986; Gibbs et al., 1989; Hamblin and
Gibbs, 1999; Titone and Connine, 1999; Peterson et al., 2001;
Tabossi et al., 2005, 2008; Sprenger et al., 2006; Smolka et al.,
2007; Schweigert, 2009; Fanari et al., 2010; Holsinger and Kaiser,
2013). As indicated by these references and from the idiom lit-
erature in general, the vast majority of studies have been aimed
at trying to specify how idiomatic expressions are processed and
understood. Themajor research questions have generally centered
around investigating the extent to which idiom comprehension is
distinct from or relies on the same lexical, semantic, and syntac-
tic processes involved in the processing of regular literal language
(Burt, 1992; Peterson et al., 2001; Tabossi et al., 2005; Vespignani
et al., 2010), particularly the degree to which the literal meaning
of the component words and of the phrase as whole is potentially
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activated and processed while the idioms is being understood
(Sprenger et al., 2006; Smolka et al., 2007; Rommers et al., 2013).
Other lines of research have focused on identifying the factors
or dimensions upon which idioms can vary, such as frequency,
familiarity, length, decomposability, transparency, predictability,
literality and their effects on how idioms are processed (Titone
and Connine, 1994a,b; Libben and Titone, 2008; Tabossi et al.,
2008; Skoufaki, 2009; Fanari et al., 2010). However, a review of
this literature is really beyond the scope of this paper, since the
goal of the present study was to see if it would be possible to
activate idiomatic meaning motorically as a result of participants
simply engaging in positions or actions like “sticking their neck
out,” “sitting on the edge of their seat,” or “burying a hatchet,”
without being told or presented with the actual idiomatic expres-
sions themselves. In other words, the purpose of the current
study was to investigate the extent to which the representations
of some idioms may be embodied and grounded in sensorimo-
tor experiences since prior approaches and research on idioms,
as mentioned above, have generally been couched in traditional
views of cognition and psycholinguistics, with words and phrases
presumed to be relatively abstract, arbitrary, amodal symbols.
This type of standard amodal psycholinguistic approach is also
evident in the main theories proposed to explain how idioms are
processed. For example, one of the earliest theories of idiom com-
prehension, the lexical representation hypothesis, suggested that
the processing of idioms was similar to the processing of long
words whose meaning is simply accessed and retrieved from the
lexicon (Swinney and Cutler, 1979). More recent theories, like
the decomposition account propose that idiomatic representation
varies as a function of compositionality such that some com-
ponent words carry more idiomatic meaning than others (pop
the question vs. kick the bucket), with highly non-decomposable
idioms resulting in faster processing and greater “direct access”
to meaning (Gibbs et al., 1989). Alternatively, the configura-
tion approach posits that idioms are represented like any other
expression, as a configuration of words that are processed on a
word-by-word basis until enough words are configured to retrieve
the stored idiomatic string and its meaning (Cacciari and Tabossi,
1988; Cacciari et al., 2007; Tabossi et al., 2009). Since the con-
figuration hypothesis proposes that all idioms are processed like
regular literal language until the phrase is identified as an idiom
whose meaning is then holistically retrieved, it can thus be con-
sidered to represent a hybrid of both decompositional and more
unitary non-compositional theories. A variety of hybrid accounts
have also been proposed, claiming that the literal meaning and
syntactic structure of idioms are always represented and processed
to some extent, although they differ in the specific manner by
which this occurs (Cutting and Bock, 1997; Titone and Connine,
1999; Sprenger et al., 2006; Caillies and Butcher, 2007; Libben and
Titone, 2008).
It is such hybrid accounts that currently seem to have the
greatest amount of experimental support (Titone and Connine,
1999; Sprenger et al., 2006; Caillies and Butcher, 2007; Libben
and Titone, 2008; Tabossi et al., 2009; Caillies and Declerq, 2011;
Holsinger and Kaiser, 2013). However, it should be clear that
all of these theories have been focused on the processing of
idiomatic expressions, particularly how their non-literal meaning
is understood given that its connection to the words in the utter-
ance is generally not clear. Across all of these accounts there is
nothing to suggest that the words and phrases in these expres-
sions consist of anything other than standard amodal symbols or
lemmas (Cutting and Bock, 1997; Sprenger et al., 2006) with links
to their literal and figurative conceptual representations.
In contrast to these types of conventional psycholinguis-
tic theories, there is now considerable evidence that much of
our cognitive functioning, conceptual representations, and lan-
guage processes are fundamentally grounded in our sensorimotor
and perceptual experiences (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999;
Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Zwaan and Madden, 2005; Gibbs, 2006b).
For example, Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) found that participants
processed pictures faster when they had the same orientation
implied in a preceding sentence, such that they responded faster
to a vertical rather than horizontal picture of a pencil after reading
John put the pencil in the cup, suggesting that implicit percep-
tual simulations primed participants to more quickly recognize
corresponding spatial orientations. Similarly, Zwaan et al. (2002)
found that after reading sentences like The ranger saw the eagle in
the sky, participants were faster to respond by naming or deciding
that spatially congruent pictures (i.e., an eagle with outstretched
wings) as opposed to incongruent images like an eagle with folded
wings corresponded to a word in the sentence, again showing that
participants’ comprehension was perceptually biased. A series of
studies by Matlock and colleagues has shown that the reading
latencies of sentences with implied or “fictive” motion such as
the road runs through the valley were affected by the speed of
motion, type of travel or distance conveyed in a preceding story
(Matlock, 2004); and conversely, that fictive motion sentences
can influence the subsequent interpretation of an ambiguous
sentence like Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward
two days (Matlock et al., 2005), as well the duration and man-
ner of an individual’s eye movements (Richardson and Matlock,
2007). More recently, Ansorge et al. (2010) have further demon-
strated that such embodied effects can even be obtained with
masked subliminal spatial prime words like high that can facilitate
the processing of related target words like above, in addition to
affecting the performance of spatially congruent or incongruent
responses.
Further support for the embodiment of language comes from
research showing that conceptual processing can both affect or
be affected by the activity of corresponding perceptual and motor
brain regions. For instance, an fMRI study by Hauk et al. (2004)
showed that simply reading action words referring to the face,
arms, and legs (e.g., lick, pick, or kick) resulted in somatotopic
motor cortex activation in regions corresponding to the body
part responsible for that action. In another study of arm- and
leg-related words (e.g., fold, beat, grasp vs. kick, hike, step) words,
Pulvermüller et al. (2005) used transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) to disrupt neural activity in arm areas of the left language-
dominant hemisphere and obtained faster responses to leg-related
terms, whereas TMS applied to leg areas facilitated responses to
arm terms. These and other findings described in a review by
Fischer and Zwaan (2008) therefore provide considerable support
that language comprehension can be facilitated or hindered by
perceptual and motor processes.
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Although such findings are convincing, the objection could
be raised that the concrete or highly imageable nature of the
stimuli biases responses in the direction of embodied effects.
Figurative language provides a stronger test for embodiment
because even when figurative expressions involve concrete terms
their meanings typically refer to abstract concepts divorced from
their embodied origins. However, there is now a considerable
that at least some types of figurative expressions, particularly
metaphors, are also embodied. One of the earliest and most
comprehensive proposals along these lines was the conceptual
metaphor theory (CMT) proposed in a seminal book by Lakoff
and Johnson (1980), suggesting that metaphors are not simply
linguistic phenomena but (1) reflect more general cognitive and
experiential aspects of how concepts are represented and pro-
cessed in the human mind, and (2) represent a new tool for
gaining insight into the acquisition of conceptual knowledge, par-
ticularly our knowledge and understanding of abstract concepts
like GOOD or BAD which become metaphorically represented
as being high or low in a spatial sense. The validity of under-
lying conceptual metaphors like GOOD IS UP has been shown
in several experiments demonstrating how different concepts and
psychological states (i.e., power, affect, the divine, and even real
estate)map onto the vertical axis to demonstrate that UP is indeed
generally associated with GOOD (Meier and Robinson, 2004,
2006; Schubert, 2005; Giessner and Schubert, 2007; Meier et al.,
2007a,b, 2011).
Other studies have examined the PERSONALITY or
FRIENDLINESS is TEMPERATURE metaphor and found
that incidental experiences with physical warmth (holding hot vs.
iced coffee) induced “warm” judgments about others (e.g., trust)
(Williams and Bargh, 2008), that people regulate social warmth
with physical warmth (i.e., lonelier people had an increased
tendency to take warm baths/showers) (Bargh and Shalev, 2012),
and that those who were socially ostracized felt physically colder
than those who were not (Zhong and Leonardelli, 2008). A recent
investigation by Gibbs (2013) examined the embodiment of the
RELATIONSHIPS ARE JOURNEYS metaphor by presenting
participants with brief passages describing either a smoothly
developing relationship or one with difficulties that are still
there and have not been overcome, in either metaphorical or
non-metaphorical language. When participants were later asked
to walk or imagine themselves walking to a marked spot 40 feet
away, those presented with the successful relationship walked
longer and further than those given the unsuccessful relationship,
but only when written in language conveying a journey metaphor.
Lastly, simple metaphoric expressions like swallow your pride or
spit out the facts were found to be understood faster when they
were preceded by either the actual or imagined corresponding
action relative to mismatching action or no movement control
conditions, and these findings were not simply due to lexical-
semantic activation or associations (Wilson and Gibbs, 2007).
A thorough review and discussion about the embodiment of
metaphor is beyond the scope of this paper, but readers may
consult the following references (Gibbs, 2006a; Gibbs et al., 2006;
Gibbs and Matlock, 2008; Ritchie, 2008; Falck and Gibbs, 2012).
Most of the aforementioned work has focused on the manner
in which concrete, embodied states facilitate the activation of
pre-existing conceptual knowledge, but it has also recently been
shown that higher-order, abstract and ill-defined processes like
creativity can be enhanced by embodying metaphors (Slepian
et al., 2010; Leung et al., 2012; see Eskine and Kaufman, 2012, for
a review).
All of these findings suggest that metaphors are more than
linguistic expressions; they are indicative of how embodied expe-
riences influence both the activation and processing of various
conceptual representations. However, a potential criticism of this
work is that the mappings between the embodied source domains
and the abstract target domains in many metaphors can be quite
direct and obvious (consider the physical/interpersonal warmth
research). In addition, the proponents of metaphor embodiment
do not claim that their findings “necessarily generalize to all kinds
of metaphorical language. . . [and that] embodied simulation is
necessarily central to all aspects of metaphor comprehension”
(Gibbs, 2013, pp. 376–377). This point is potentially important
with respect to the embodiment of idioms since they have, by
definition, generally lost the metaphorical connection to the ori-
gin of their meaning (see the graded account and findings by
Desai et al., 2013, mentioned in the next section). Another crit-
ical issue regarding the embodiment of language and metaphor is
the extent to which the activation of sensorimotor is a really fun-
damental and obligatory part of conceptual representation and
processing, or an epiphenomenal byproduct of contextual prim-
ing effects or other underlying amodal mechanisms (Mahon and
Caramazza, 2008; Dove, 2009). Putting these issues aside, there
is now strong support that the comprehension of at least some
metaphors relies on embodied sensorimotor simulations, includ-
ing the results of some recent neuroimaging studies (Chen et al.,
2008; Desai et al., 2011, 2013; Lacey et al., 2012).
Contrary to the considerable behavioral and neuroscientific
research on the embodiment of metaphors, very little work has
been done to investigate the extent to which idioms may also be
embodied. This is likely because in contrast to the perceptually
rich and verbally creative quality of metaphors, idioms seem like
the hallmark of fixed amodal expressions whose meaning must
be explicitly learned, stored, and retrieved from memory. Idioms
therefore appear to present a potential challenge for embodied
theories of cognition because it seems improbable that the com-
prehension of idiomatic meaning would involve the activation
of perceptual and/or motor regions rather than simply linguistic
information. However, due to the considerable amount of evi-
dence demonstrating the embodiment of cognition across various
domains such as literal and non-literal language like metaphors,
there have been a small but slowly growing number of studies to
investigate whether idioms are embodied.
Prior to describing those findings, it is worth considering
some earlier work that was not really aimed at investigating the
embodiment of idioms per se, but consisted of behavioral inves-
tigations of the extent to which individuals seem to use mental
imagery and underlying conceptual metaphors (that appear to
be embodied from the evidence above) in the comprehension
of idiomatic meaning. The results of this research have gener-
ally been mixed, such that some researchers obtained evidence
to support that hypothesis (Gibbs and O’Brien, 1990; Nayak and
Gibbs, 1990; Gibbs et al., 1997; Gibbs and Bogdonovich, 1999;
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Nippold and Duthie, 2003), while others have failed to support
the hypothesis (Glucksberg et al., 1993; Cacciari and Glucksberg,
1995; Keysar and Bly, 1995, 1999; McGlone, 1996; Glucksberg
and McGlone, 1999; Keysar et al., 2000). Recent efforts to exam-
ine the embodiment of idioms have mostly focused on using
functional imaging and other neuroscientific techniques to deter-
mine whether comprehending idiomatic expressions involves the
activity of perceptual and motor areas of the brain.
Similar to the behavioral studies cited above, this research
has also produced contradictory results. Specifically, a couple
of recent fMRI and MEG studies by Boulenger and colleagues
showed that sentences with leg- and arm-related words used in
an idiomatic or literal sense (e.g., He kicked the habit vs. He
kicked the statue) each activated somatotopically corresponding
areas of motor cortex (although the “leg effect” in the MEG only
approached significance) and that the time course of this activa-
tion was generally similar and relatively rapid, within 150–250ms,
for both types of stimuli (Boulenger et al., 2009 and Boulenger
et al., 2012, respectively). These findings therefore generally sup-
port the embodiment of idioms, but it is worth noting that the
idiomatic sentences in the latter MEG study produced signifi-
cantly stronger early activation than literal sentences in language
regions like the left temporal pole, Broca’s area in the left inferior
frontal cortex, and the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Overall,
however, the brief latencies and region-specific patterns of acti-
vation in these studies suggest that word meaning is recruited
from sensoriperceptual systems and that idioms are semantically
grounded in the motor system.
Some further but very weak evidence for the embodiment of
idioms comes from a couple of recent studies by Desai et al.
(2013) and Lauro et al. (2013). Both groups of researchers
obtained significant activation in sensory and motor regions for
metaphorical sentences like The congress is grasping the state of
affairs or Matilde throws her sadness far away (translated from
Italian in Lauro et al., 2013), whereas the results for idiomatic
sentences (e.g., The congress is grasping at straws in the crisis) only
approached significance and showed trends toward the expected
effects. In both cases the authors argue for a graded account of
embodiment suggesting that as the meaning of an expression
becomes increasingly more conventional and abstract, as in the
transition from metaphoric to idiomatic meaning, the weaker
and less likely it is to activate perceptual and motor brain areas.
Even though their results for idioms were non-significant, these
researchers claim that their overall findings generally support the
embodiment of figurative language.
This is in contrast to several studies that have all failed to pro-
vide evidence to support the embodiment of idioms (Aziz-Zadeh
et al., 2006; Raposo et al., 2009; Cacciari et al., 2011; Cacciari and
Pesciarelli, 2013). For example, the study by Cacciari et al. (2011)
involved administering TMS pulses to the leg region of motor
cortex and was unable to show significant motor evoked poten-
tials (MEPs) in leg muscles for idiomatic sentences, although
MEPs were obtained in response to literal and metaphoric stim-
uli. Furthermore, both fMRI investigations by Aziz-Zadeh et al.
(2006) and Raposo et al. (2009) failed to show significant neu-
ral activity in corresponding motor or premotor cortices for
expressions like kick the bucket and biting off more than you
can chew. In sum, the findings in both the behavioral and neu-
roscentific literature are contradictory and the extent to which
sensorimotor systems contribute to idiomatic meaning remains
unclear. Indeed, given that only Boulenger and colleagues have
been able to find significant results in the neural domain thus far
(Boulenger et al., 2009, 2012), most of the evidence suggests that
idioms are not embodied.
As described and to our knowledge, most of the work regard-
ing the embodiment of idioms and language in general, has
involved presenting participants with verbal stimuli to see how
they subsequently affect their behavioral responses and activate
their perceptual and/or motor brain regions. In contrast, the
current study took the relatively novel approach of reversing
this design, to examine whether putting individuals into senso-
rimotor states corresponding to certain idioms would activate
their meaning and affect participants’ subsequent judgments. If
embodying idioms solely by having people engage in the relevant
actions without exposure to the actual expressions can activate
their meaning, it would suggest that perceptual-motor symbols
are a fundamental part of their representation and substan-
tially increase our understanding of how idioms are processed,
in addition to providing further evidence for embodiment as
the foundation of cognitive and linguistic processing. Since the
existing support for the embodiment of idioms was weak and
it seemed questionable whether the act of “sticking one’s neck
out” or “sitting on a fence” could really instantiate the corre-
sponding meanings of taking a risk or being undecided, the study
was meant to be an initial exploration of this issue with a lim-
ited number of stimuli in a highly plausible experimental context.
The whole premise of demonstrating idiomatic embodiment in
this paradigm hinges upon participants not being aware that the
positions and actions they have to perform represent idioms and
potentially recognizing the hypothesis.
Specifically, they were told that the purpose of the study was
to investigate how reading comprehension may be affected by dif-
ferent positions and movements. We developed a relatively long
story involving a crime and subsequent courtroom drama. The
whole narrative was designed to read and flow as one coherent
story, but it consisted of four parts that were each written to
relate to the meaning of a particular idiom. Each portion of the
story was followed by a set of four questions designed to mea-
sure the extent to which the idiomatic meaning was activated,
which was the dependent variable (DV). With respect to both
the stories and questions, the idioms were never actually men-
tioned and considerable effort was taken to avoid using words and
phrases closely associated to the idiomatic expressions and their
meanings, to prevent them from being simply activated by verbal
means. Further information will be provided in the method sec-
tion, but the idioms used were: sticking one’s neck out, sitting on
the fence, sitting on the edge of one’s seat, and burying the hatchet.
They were chosen because (1) they could plausibly be worked
into the context of the story, (2) involved sustained positions or
actions that could be maintained while participants read portions
of the story and responded to the questions, and (3) because pre-
testing of potential idioms by 30 students (19 female) similar to
those participating in the experiment, indicated that were famil-
iar and understood by at least 70% of those individuals. For each
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part of the story, participants were assigned to one of three con-
ditions (embodied idiom, embodied control, or normal control),
where they either performed the position or action correspond-
ing to the idiom, a different control position or action, or were
simply seated in a normal comfortable position, respectively, in
a counter-balanced manner. In other words, every participant
engaged in each condition at least once across the 4 portions of
the story, with each condition occurring an equal number of times
across participants.
To our knowledge, the present study thus appears to be the
first to investigate the embodiment of idioms by seeing whether
having participants simply perform an idiomatic action would
be enough to induce their meaning and affect subsequent judg-
ments. It was predicted that embodying the idioms compared
to the two types of control conditions, would result in stronger
responses to the questions in the direction of the idiomatic
meaning. Demonstrating the embodiment of idioms through this
relatively novel approach (see Wilson and Gibbs, 2007; Leung
et al., 2012, for similar efforts with metaphors), would provide
further support that non-literal abstract meanings can still be
grounded in sensorimotor experiences, particularly with respect
to idioms where the evidence has been mixed.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The participants consisted of 60 Brooklyn College undergraduates
(35 females, 25males) who participated in this research for course
credit. Prior to participating in the experiment, they were asked to
complete a survey about their language background(s). This was
to ensure that they had sufficient exposure to the English language
by 5 years of age, and maximize the likelihood that they would
be familiar with the idioms and the ability to read and under-
stand the narrative and questions. Although every participant was
exposed to English by the time they were 5 years old, the language
history forms indicated that 17 individuals had more familiar-
ity and knowledge of another language in those early years. Since
many Brooklyn College students come from recently immigrated
families it is almost impossible to find “pure” monolingual native
English speakers. In fact, only 18 out of 60 participants reported
that they were not exposed to any other language(s) by the time
they were 5 years old.
As described above, participants were randomly assigned to
one of three conditions for each part of the story in a counter-
balanced order and mixed design, such that each participant
experienced each condition over the course of the study, but were
only assigned to one condition for the portion of the story cor-
responding to a particular idiom. In other words, one participant
would have sat normally for the first part of the story (normal
control condition), performed the idiomatic action for the next
part of the story (embodied idiom condition), engaged in another
control action for the third part of the story (embodied control
condition), and sat normally again (normal control condition)
for the last part of the story. Another participant would have
embodied the idiom for the first part of the story, then engaged
in a control position, then sat normally, and embodied the idiom
again for the final part of the story, and so on, with each condi-
tion occurring equally often in all possible orders, and resulting
in 20 participants per condition for each portion of the story (i.e.,
idiom).
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
As mentioned, the story was written and designed to be admin-
istered in four sections, corresponding to different idioms and
described in further detail below. Every phase of the story began
with a couple of introductory sentences to set the scene, followed
by 3–4 substantive paragraphs of roughly similar length, rang-
ing from about 300-400 words. Each portion of the story was
followed by a set of 4 questions created to assess the strength of
the activation of the idiomatic meaning alluded to in the preced-
ing part of the text, and responded to on a 6-point scale (1 =
strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree), such that the DV consisted
of the mean rating across each set of 4 responses. It is important
to note that the actual idioms were not mentioned in any of these
materials, and care was taken to avoid using words and phrases
strongly related to the idiomatic expressions and their meaning.
The complete narrative will be described further momentarily,
but an example of one section of the story and corresponding
questions is provided in Appendix A/Supplementary Materials 1.
The full set of materials can be obtained from the author.
The entire story described a court room drama starting with
the suspect’s account and written so that it could be interpreted
like the suspect had stuck his neck out (i.e., taken a risk) by getting
into a friend’s car which ended up resulting in a robbery and acci-
dental murder. This idiom was embodied by having participants
literally sit and stick their necks out while reading that part of the
story and responding to the questions. An example of one of the
risk-related questions that participants had to answer was “Pat
was exercising caution as he let Justin drive oddly silent,” which
was reverse coded. The next portion of the story consisted of
the prosecuting and defense attorneys’ explanations of the mur-
der which showed that both sides had good points and the case
was not clear cut, to convey the idiom of sitting on the fence (i.e.,
feeling ambivalent about a decision), which was embodied by par-
ticipants straddling a height-adjustable sawhorse such that only
the tips of their toes abutted the floor, resulting in an unbalanced
state. The set of items to which participants had to respond are
listed in the Appendix. The third part of the story involved the
judge’s comments leading-up to the delivery of the jury’s verdict,
written in relation to the idiom of sitting on the edge of your seat
(i.e., feeling excited or anxious about an outcome), which was
embodied with participants literally sitting on the edge of their
seat. An example question was “I am eager to hear what the ver-
dict will be.” Finally, the last part of the narrative dealt with the
convict’s life and thoughts after the guilty verdict, particularly
with respect to his partner in crime to relate to the idiom burying
the hatchet (i.e., the willingness to forgive). In the embodiment
condition, participants were presented with two large catering
trays. The left tray contained a small hatchet (with its safety guard
on), the right tray was filled with dirt, and participants had to
bury the hatchet with dirt using a 1-cup scoop. An example item
to which participants responded was “Pat will probably overlook
Justin’s offense by the time they meet again.”
As explained before, participants were assigned to one of
three conditions for each portion of the narrative, either (1) the
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embodiment conditions described above, (2) a normal control
condition where they were comfortably seated in front of desk
and read normally, or (3) an embodied control condition that
involved engaging in a non-idiomatic position or action while
reading the passage and answering the questions. The purpose
of this latter embodied control condition was to make sure that
the effects obtained were not simply due to participants being
slightly distracted or uncomfortable while reading and respond-
ing to questions in the embodied idiom condition. For the more
“positional,” “sticking one’s neck out,” “sitting on the fence,” and
“sitting on the edge of one’s seat” idiomatic actions, participants
in the embodied control conditions stood cross-legged while lean-
ing against a wall. However, since the action of “burying the
hatchet” involved moving one’s hand to scoop dirt and dump it
over a hatchet in a neighboring tray, the embodied control con-
dition involved participants sitting at the same desk, but moving
dominoes from one side of the table to the other. These condi-
tions were chosen after testing various options because they were
judged to be similar to the embodied idiom conditions in terms
of positional awkwardness and motoric action.
Participants were instructed that we were investigating the
effects of motor information on text comprehension and that they
would be required to perform specific positions/actions while
reading a story and responding to questions. While giving par-
ticipants instructions, it is critically important to note that the
experimenter never uttered words associated with the idioms and
their meaning, let alone the idiomatic expressions themselves,
so that they would not be verbally activated. Instead, partici-
pants were asked to basically imitate the same position or action
demonstrated by the experimenter while they read each part of
the story and answered the corresponding questions. Since the
study was designed around one continuous and coherent narra-
tive, the participants were all presented with the sections of the
story in the same order, but engaged in different positions or
actions for each phase based on the conditions to which they were
assigned. After the critical idiom embodiment story task, partici-
pants completed a distracter task where they read and underlined
passages from a text, followed by a questionnaire to assess their
understanding of the target idioms (explaining the meaning of
example sentences) and their familiarity with the expressions. The
entire study took about 75min to complete.
NORMATIVE DATA
A separate group of participants (N = 31, 15 females) rated
the idioms for decomposability, literality, and transparency on
5-point scales, with 1 = completely non-X and 5 = completely
X1. Idioms can vary on these dimension and these variables can
1Decomposability refers to the extent to which idioms’ individual words con-
tribute to their overall figurative meaning. For example, save your skin is
decomposable because the word “save” relates to the overall idiom meaning
(to protect or save yourself). Literality refers to whether the idiom also has
a plausible literal meaning. For example, kick the bucket figuratively means
to die and literally means to strike a pail with your foot. However, the idiom
under the weather, which figuratively means to be ill, does not have as clear
a literal meaning. Transparency refers to how clearly and directly the figura-
tive idiomatic meaning is related to the expression’s literal meaning. While
all idioms have a meaningful idiomatic or figurative interpretation, they vary
affect how idioms are processed (Westbury and Titone, 2011).
This information was collected to accurately assess our stimuli on
these dimensions and to examine which variables are more or less
important in determiningwhich idioms are likely to be embodied.
The ratings were obtained by embedding our critical items into a
larger set of idioms, and the resulting data is presented in Table 1.
RESULTS
All participants were included in the analyses because none of
them correctly identified the real purpose of the experiment or
had to be excluded for other reasons. In addition, post-testing
results indicated that all four idioms were understood and famil-
iar to the vast majority of participants (see Table 2). Due to the
inherent differences between the idiomatic actions, segments of
the story, and subsequent questions, the approach used to analyze
the data was to conduct separate One-Way analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) across the 3 conditions for each portion of the nar-
rative. Specifically, responses to the 4 questions corresponding to
each idiom and phase of the study were averaged into a single
score to reflect the activation strength of that idiomatic mean-
ing. One-Way ANOVAs were run for each idiom along with Tukey
Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) tests.
Results revealed that actually “sticking your neck out” signifi-
cantly increased risk judgments (M = 4.49, SD = 0.61) relative
to the embodied control (M = 3.71, SD = 0.93) and normal
control (M = 3.8, SD = 0.55) conditions, F(2, 57) = 6.981, p =
0.002, η2p = 0.197, with the latter two conditions not significantly
differing, p = 0.92. “Sitting on the fence” also induced more
Table 1 | Normative idiom ratings on relevant dimensions.
Idiom Decomposability Literality Transparency
Sticking your neck
out
2.52 (1.00) 3.58 (1.03) 3.68 (1.17)
Sitting on the fence 2.13 (1.11) 3.58 (1.36) 3.19 (1.13)
Sitting on the edge
of your seat
2.71 (1.10) 3.39 (1.28) 3.16 (0.86)
Burying the hatchet 2.32 (1.38) 3.23 (1.36) 2.26 (1.00)
Mean ratings of each dimension with standard deviations in parentheses. Higher
values indicate stronger endorsement of each dimension.
Table 2 | Percentages of participants who understood and were
familiar with the idioms.
Idiom Understood (%) Familiarity (%)
Sticking your neck out 88.3 90
Sitting on the fence 86.7 83.3
Sitting on the edge of your seat 96.7 95
Burying the hatchet 95 83.3
in the degree to which they’re transparent or opaque. For example, jump the
gun, which figuratively means to start ahead of time, is relatively transparent
because its literal meaning clearly motivates its figurative meaning, whereas
the meaning of kick the bucket is more opaque because there is no clear and
transparent relationship between its literal and figurative meaning.
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FIGURE 1 | Mean ratings across the 4 questions designed to assess the strength of the activation of each idiom’s meaning (i.e., the idiomatic
judgment task). Higher numbers indicate a greater endorsement of the idiom’s meaning and error bars represent standard error of the means.
ambivalent judgments (M = 4.45, SD = 0.58) relative to the
embodied control (M = 3.69, SD = 0.96) and normal control
(M = 3.49, SD = 0.95) conditions, F(2, 57) = 7.174, p = 0.002,
η2p = 0.201, with the latter two conditions not significantly dif-
fering, p = 0.74. Literally “sitting on the edge of your seat”
significantly increased judgments of excitement (M = 5.16,
SD = 1.13) relative to the embodied control (M = 3.84,
SD = 1.62) and normal control (M = 3.68, SD = 1.79) con-
ditions, F(2, 57) = 5.640, p = 0.006, η2p = 0.165, with the latter
two conditions not significantly differing, p = 0.94. However, the
effect for “burying the hatchet” was not found to be significant,
F < 12.
These results are displayed in Figure 1, which shows that the
idiomatic embodiment condition generally resulted in higher
mean responses across the questions designed to measure the
activation of each idiom’s meaning, than either of the con-
trol conditions. Although the analysis for “burying the hatchet”
2The same analyses were also conducted on the subset of 43 participants
(with the caveat that conditions were no longer fully counterbalanced) after
excluding the 17 individuals who had reported greater exposure and knowl-
edge of another language besides English in their first 5 years. These results
are reported in Appendix B/Supplementary Material 2 and generally followed
the same patterns as the overall analyses. Additional examination of the data
on a participant-by-participant basis revealed that the effects were moder-
ately robust across participants, with 65% (or 39/60) individuals showing
the expected pattern of stronger ratings in the embodied vs. control con-
ditions, whereas the other 35% (or 21/60 participants) gave ratings in one
or both control conditions that were higher or equivalent to the embodied
conditions. Interestingly, there was a slight tendency for less native speakers
(i.e., those with less exposure to English by 5 years of age) to be less likely to
show the expected effects. Specifically, out of the 21 participants not follow-
ing the expected pattern 9 of them consisted of the less “native” individuals,
while only 8 of them followed the predicted pattern. In other words, 31 of the
39 participants who showed the expected results were individuals with more
exposure to English in their early years.
was not significant, Figure 1 shows that the mean ratings fol-
lowed the same expected pattern. To investigate why, repeated-
measures ANOVAs were conducted on the decomposability,
literality, and transparency ratings. The idioms were not dif-
ferent in decomposability and literality, Fs < 1, but did dif-
fer in transparency, F(3, 90) = 10.489, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.259
(assumptions of sphericity were met). Post-hoc pairwise com-
parisons with Bonferroni corrections showed that burying the
hatchet was rated significantly less transparent and thus more
opaque than the other three idioms, which were not significantly
different.
DISCUSSION
The current research was intended to be an exploratory
study about whether embodying idioms could instantiate
their meaning to subsequently affect processing and judg-
ments. Recall that previous behavioral and neuroimaging inves-
tigations of this issue had produced mixed results (Gibbs
and Bogdonovich, 1999; Glucksberg and McGlone, 1999;
Keysar et al., 2000; Nippold and Duthie, 2003; Boulenger
et al., 2009, 2012; Lauro et al., 2013), with a majority of
studies failing to show significant activation in perceptual
and motor brain areas in response to idiomatic expressions
(Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Raposo et al., 2009; Cacciari et al., 2011;
Desai et al., 2013). In contrast to the neuroimaging approach of
examining participants’ brain activity after exposure to idiomatic
stimuli, the present study involved placing participants into the
sensorimotor states corresponding to certain idioms to deter-
mine whether that could significantly activate their meaning. The
results showed that this was indeed the case, thereby providing
evidence that at least some idioms have an embodied aspect of
their representational structure, and suggesting that embodiment
may be more fundamental to the conceptual representations and
processing of idiomatic expressions than previously thought.
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The approach of the present study is somewhat similar to stud-
ies by Ackerman et al. (2010); Leung et al. (2012), and Wilson
and Gibbs (2007) that investigated the effects of having partici-
pants embody metaphoric actions. Specifically, Ackerman et al.
(2010) examined the metaphorical association between physical
weight and concepts of severity and importance by showing that
participants judged a job candidate to be better if they evalu-
ated him on a heavy vs. light clipboard. Similarly, in another
couple of studies investigating the metaphorical links between
physically rough textures and harsh or difficult situations, they
found that participants judged an ambiguous social situation to
be less coordinated (i.e., more difficult and harsh) after work-
ing on a puzzle with rough sandpaper-covered pieces compared
to those who handled smooth puzzle pieces. The purpose of
Ackerman et al.’s experiments was to examine how haptic expe-
riences can affect interpersonal judgments. The focus of the study
by Leung et al. (2012) was different and designed to investigate
whether embodying metaphoric actions is linked to creative pro-
cesses, by seeing if literally thinking about things “on one hand
and then the other,” “thinking outside the box,” or “putting 2
and 2 together,” would actually increase measures of creativity.
As expected, they found that participants who were seated out-
side of a box, allowed to walk freely, or who combined the halves
of circles together, generally performed better on various conver-
gent and divergent thinking tasks, compared to individuals sitting
inside a box, required to walk in a fixed, rectangular path, or who
didn’t combine circle halves together, respectively.
Finally, in the study by Wilson and Gibbs (2007) participants
were trained to perform various actions such as pushing, spitting,
and grasping in response to symbols like &,:, and “, displayed on
a computer prior to being presented with a phrase like push the
argument, spit out the facts, and grasp a concept. Wilson and Gibbs
found that the responses to those phrases were significantly faster
when preceded by matching as opposed to non-matching actions
or when preceded by no action. All of these studies thus show
that the physical embodiment of metaphors can affect a variety
of subsequent processes, but the present research appears to be
the first investigation to have taken this approach with idioms.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that some of the stimuli from these
prior studies consisted of familiar conventionalized phrases like
think outside the box, put 2 and 2 together, swallow your pride, sniff
out the truth, and shake off a feeling, that are likely not that differ-
ent from the idioms examined in this study. However, in contrast
to Wilson and Gibbs (2007) and possibly Leung et al. (2012),
participants in the current investigation were never actually pre-
sented with the figurative utterances themselves3 . Wilson and
Gibbs provide evidence that their participants were unaware of
the connection between the metaphoric actions and expressions,
and that their results were not due to lexically-based associations
3With respect to study by Leung et al. (2012), the extent to which creativity
metaphors may have been verbally induced while giving participants instruc-
tions is unclear. This issue does not appear to be problematic for Ackerman
et al. (2010) because their study was not testing specific metaphoric phrases,
but rather the underlying conceptual metaphors that give rise to a variety of
expressions such as the “gravity of a situation,” “having a rough day,” and
someone being “hard-hearted.”
and activation of the figurative meaning. In order to most con-
vincingly demonstrate the embodiment of idioms in the current
investigation, we thought it best to completely avoid any sort of
linguistic instantiation of the idiom or its meaning.
As mentioned, the goal of this study was to investigate
idiomatic embodiment with a small number of idioms in a
well-designed and plausible experimental procedure where par-
ticipants would not recognize that the actions they were asked
to do corresponded to idioms and come close to guessing the
true purpose of the experiment. Although the pattern of results
across the embodied idiom compared to both control conditions
clearly supports the embodiment of some idioms, the study is
clearly limited by the restricted set of idioms. It will therefore be
up to future research to design a study investigating the general-
izability of these results to a larger set of stimuli, perhaps with a
procedure more akin to that of Wilson and Gibbs (2007), because
the length of the story segments and sets of questions from the
present experiment resulted in a study that was already over an
hour long.
This limitation aside, the present study indicates that the
sensorimotor experiences of engaging in idiomatic actions instan-
tiated their meaning to affect participants’ processing of the
discourse and their responses to the corresponding questions. A
potential account of these findings will be presented shortly, but
let us first consider other reasons why these results may have been
obtained. One possibility is that the current effects could be due
to motor imagery rather than embodiment per se (Willems et al.,
2010; Cacciari et al., 2011; Schuil et al., 2013). Distinguishing
these concepts can be difficult and some researchers treat them
synonymously, but motor imagery has been defined as the covert
or mental “simulation” of bodily movement that involves the
activation and monitoring of a motor plan without the overt exe-
cution of an action (Willems et al., 2010; Tomasino et al., 2011).
Since participants in the current study were actually perform-
ing the actions, it seems unlikely and counter to the definition
of motor imagery that they would simultaneously be imagining
those movements as well. If anything, it’s more likely that they
may have been imaging the content of the narrative and accom-
panying questions. A related issue is that the concepts underlying
the idioms (e.g., taking a risk, indecision) may have simply been
activated as a result of reading the story. While both of the lat-
ter phenomena could be true, all of the participants received
identical materials (i.e., the same story and questions), so any
concepts that could have been imaged or activated were kept
constant across participants, but the embodiment conditions still
resulted in higher ratings. This indicates that there must be some-
thing about the cases where participants performed the idiomatic
actions relative to the control conditions that caused them to
respond more strongly to the questions. It is also possible that the
current findings resulted from a synergistic interaction between
the text, questions, and idiomatic actions, rather than just the
embodiment of the idioms per se. However, even if that was the
case, it still means that embodying the idioms contributed some-
thing distinct to how the narrative was processed and understood
above and beyond the other conditions.
Since participants were never explicitly told or asked about the
idioms directly, we also cannot be certain that they were activating
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the exact intended expressions. There are many idioms conveying
risk, some of which would also be compatible with the action of
putting one’s head and neck forward (e.g., to put one’s head/neck
on the block, to put/stick one’s head in a noose, put one’s neck on
the line). Given human experience about the importance and
vulnerability of one’s neck, the existence of multiple expressions
conveying risk and involving the neck and head is no coinci-
dence and further supports the embodiment of some idioms. Of
course there are other idioms like playing with fire, playing Russian
roulette, skating on thin ice, and walking into the lion’s den that also
convey risk. It seems unlikely that they would have been activated
by the current procedure, but that is an interesting question for
future research. Specifically, would activating the concept of risk
by the movement of “sticking one’s neck out” generalize and facil-
itate the processing of other “non-neck” idioms like skating on
thin ice. Similarly, with respect to being on the fence, other idioms
about indecision also typically convey a similar state of unbalance
and sense of going back and forth or side to side (e.g., hem and
haw, go to and fro, be of two minds, and torn/tugged/pulled in 2
directions or between 2 options). Hence, the extent to which strad-
dling a sawhorse activated sitting on the fence rather than one or
more of these analogous expressions is unclear, as is the issue of
whether other indecision idioms like being in a quandary, dragging
one’s feet, or still up in the air, may have been activated.
Since the current findings indicate that the meaning of certain
idioms can be instantiated simply on the basis of sensorimotor
experience, we will now try to provide an account for why this
may be the case. Specifically, we will propose that one of the main
neural mechanisms that could underlie these effects is the human
mirror neuron system (HMNS). Mirror neurons were first identi-
fied in macaque monkeys as special cells in area F5 [in the inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG) and analogous to Broca’s area 44 in the human
brain], primary and premotor cortex, inferior parietal cortex, and
the superior temporal sulcus (Corballis, 2010; Molenberghs et al.,
2012; Traxler, 2013). These neurons would fire action potentials
both when the monkeys would observe an individual performing
a certain action and also when the monkeys engaged in the same
action themselves (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996;
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
Researchers have also identified a similar mirror neuron
system in humans, which has been invoked in accounts of
language phenomena, particularly the perception of speech,
embodiment of semantics, metaphor, interpersonal discourse,
and the evolution of language itself, as well as theory of mind,
schizophrenia, autism, alexithymia, andmultiple sclerosis (Gibbs,
2006a; Gallese, 2008; Corballis, 2010; Molenberghs et al., 2012;
Traxler, 2013). However, this research is more controversial
and should be considered with caution (Hickok, 2009; Venezia
and Hickok, 2009; Arevalo et al., 2012; Molenberghs et al.,
2012; Traxler, 2013). The network of regions involved in the
HMNS also appears to be very broad, with a recent meta-analysis
finding significant levels of activation in 34 Brodmann areas
(Molenberghs et al., 2012). However, a generally bilateral set
of regions similar to those of the monkeys (i.e., primary motor
cortex, ventral premotor cortex, IFG, superior, and inferior
parietal lobules) appear to have the strongest support, in addition
to the temporal-occipital junction, portions of the limbic system,
particularly the amygdala, insula, and cingulate gyrus, and
visual, auditory, and somatosensory cortices, depending on the
sensory modalities involved (Corballis, 2010; Arevalo et al., 2012;
Molenberghs et al., 2012). There has been considerable research
and discussion about exactly what the neurons in these brain
regions are doing, but the prevailing claim seems to be that they
are involved in generating an internal representation, possibly
even the “understanding,” of goal-directed actions, rather than
just simple imitation (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Gallese,
2008; but see Hickok, 2009; Corballis, 2010).
We are admittedly hesitant to jump onto the HMNS band-
wagon, particularly since the study did not directly investigate this
at a neural level. However, the current procedure must have acti-
vated the mirror neuron system because participants had to copy
the actions demonstrated by the experimenter. This was also true
of the control conditions and yet the embodied idiom condition
still resulted in significantly greater activation of the idiomatic
meaning as measured by the strength of participants’ responses
to the questions. Therefore, the embodiment of particular idioms
is not simply due to the activation of mirror neurons themselves,
but rather what those neurons potentially encode with respect
to the representation of idioms. Specifically, mirror neurons are
important because they interconnect the brain regions involved
in the perception of behaviors and the areas responsible for the
actual or simulated execution of those actions (Gallese and Lakoff,
2005; Gibbs, 2006a; Fogassi and Ferrari, 2007). As mentioned,
the HMNS network is thought to be particularly important for
generating an internal representation of an action or behavior
and its outcomes or goals (Gibbs, 2006a; Fogassi and Ferrari,
2007; Gallese, 2008). In addition, both the human and mon-
key research suggests that mirror neurons may be representing
actions and their intentions in a more conceptual or cognitive
form such that the purpose or consequence of a behavior can
be inferred and anticipated (Fogassi and Ferrari, 2007; Gallese,
2008; Corballis, 2010; Traxler, 2013). This possibility combined
with the fact that an action does not actually need to be executed
but can be encoded into the HMNS by imagination or simula-
tion processes (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Wilson and Gibbs, 2007;
Gallese, 2008)may explain the embodiment of certain idioms. For
instance, themeaning of an idiom like sticking one’s neck out could
become embodied as a result of people encountering individuals
being hung or beheaded, and animals being slaughtered by cut-
ting or breaking their necks4, in addition to hearing the expression
while seeing people put themselves in a variety of risky and dan-
gerous situations, such that these experiences get encoded into an
individual’s perceptual, motor, and mirror neuron systems.
The idiom of burying the hatchet reflects the means by which
fighting Native American tribes would end their conflicts and
declare peace5 (Ammer, 2003). This item is interesting because
4In the past when the idiom originated (see Rogers, 1985; Ammer, 2003)
such events would have been experienced in person, but nowadays they are
generally encountered in various forms of media.
5Another suggestion is that it comes from the expression “hang up one’s
hatchet” dating back to the early 1300s before the arrival of Christopher
Columbus, with the word “bury” replacing “hang up” in the 1700s (Ammer,
2003).
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people (at least those familiar with American history, like the
participants in this study) typically knowwhat it means. However,
unlike the other idioms in this study, it is the one least likely to be
experienced in an occasional movie, show, or book, particularly
a visual depiction of the actual procedure, although the expres-
sion itself may be encountered more frequently in contexts where
forgiveness has or has not occurred. This idiom did not show
a significant effect of embodiment, although the results went in
the expected direction. In accordance with this finding, “burying
the hatchet” was found to be significantly less transparent than
the other idioms, indicating that transparency may be a particu-
larly important factor regarding the extent to which an idiomatic
expression is embodied. Recall that transparency was defined as
the strength or closeness of the connection between the literal
and figurative meaning. The current results thus suggest that the
weaker and more distant the connection between the literal and
figurative meaning, the more likely the processing system needs
to rely on amodal linguistic symbols to represent the idiomatic
meaning. The present theoretical framework further suggests that
transparency really corresponds to the extent to which idioms
have been actually physically experienced, either by an individual
directly (e.g., someone who shifts forward to the edge of their seat
in anticipation of the next scene in a movie) or indirectly through
the observation of other individual(s) (e.g., seeing someone shift
from side to side while trying to make a decision). In other words,
transparency may reflect the strength and frequency with which
sensorimotor and mirror neuron systems have been activated by
such idiomatic experiences or encounters over time. This would
predict that all other things being equal idioms like to rock the
boat or muddy the water should be more embodied due to the
fact that most people have likely experienced the instability of
being on a boat or water becoming cloudy as dirt or sand is kicked
up, compared to expressions like to have a chip on one’s shoulder,
shoot the breeze, or paint the town red which cannot be physically
experienced to the same degree. Indeed, it would be interesting to
compare more strongly or weakly embodied idioms matched on
various other dimensions (e.g., length, frequency, decomposabil-
ity, transparency, familiarity, and literality) to determine whether
a greater degree of embodiment results in idioms that are more
easily processed and remembered than less embodied items.
We thus propose that similar to the embodiment established
for other aspects of language including metaphors, the meaning
of many idioms is grounded in actual or simulated experiences
encoded in the HMNS6, such that activating the neurons in those
corresponding perceptual and motor brain regions can in turn
instantiate the idiomatic meaning, as found in the current study.
Although it may seem obvious to explain the representation and
processing of idioms according to the experiences upon which
6The fact that simulated or imagined actions can still be encoded into the
HMNS is particularly critical for explaining how idioms like sticking one’s
neck out, stabbing someone in the back, or biting someone’s head off could
still be embodied without individuals having to personally perform those
actions. An interesting question for future research would be to examine the
degree to which such idioms may be less strongly embodied than idioms like
gritting one’s teeth or to be left out in the cold that most people have directly
experienced.
their meaning is based and understood, prior research has mainly
focused on studying the expressions themselves and their prop-
erties rather than really considering the situations they describe
and the extent to which individuals may have actually directly or
indirectly experienced them. The HMNS has been claimed to be
one of the fundamental mechanisms responsible for the embod-
iment of language in general (Barsalou, 2008, 2013; Gallese,
2008; Arevalo et al., 2012; Caligiore and Fischer, 2013; but see
Hickok, 2010) with some discussion about how mirror neurons
and simulation processes potentially underlie the comprehension
of metaphor (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Gibbs, 2006a), but to our
knowledge the current proposal appears to be first to explicitly
suggest that the HMNS may be important for the representation
and processing of idioms. A few of the previous neuroimaging
studies of idiomatic embodiment have found activity in some of
the brain areas involved in the HMNS, most notably the IFG,
motor and premotor cortices (Boulenger et al., 2009, 2012; Desai
et al., 2013). However, besides suggesting that their results pro-
vide support for the notion that abstract figurative meanings are
grounded in sensorimotor brain regions, these researchers do not
discuss or propose an account of their findings in terms of the
mirror neuron system, except for this brief comment by Desai
et al. (2013) about the activation obtained for idioms in the IFG
(BA44/6) which they describe as being “associated with tool use
and thought to be part of the mirror neuron system.” (p. 866).
The current findings in conjunction with some of the neu-
roimaging research thus appear to be indicative of a bidirectional
connection between the meaning of idiomatic expressions and
the actual or simulated experiences encoded into individuals’
perceptual and motor regions through the HMNS. If this concep-
tualization is accurate, then encountering an idiomatic expression
should re-activate those systems to some degree, but the only way
to conclusively confirm this would be by using TMS or study-
ing patients with damage to their mirror neuron systems to see
if they show any difficulty with idiom comprehension relative to
controls. Since some of the regions identified as being important
aspects of the HMNS either overlap or are in close proximity to
IFG language areas like BA44 and 45, the most convincing sup-
port for the importance of the HMNS would come from showing
that impairment of more purely motor or premotor cortices
affects idiom processing. Cacciari et al. (2011) appear to have con-
ducted the only study that has really investigated this, but they did
not obtain significant MEPs in response to idiomatic sentences
after TMS pulses to the leg region of motor cortex. Although this
finding fails to support that hypothesis, it should be noted that
significant MEPs were shown for metaphorical and fictive motion
sentences. Even though those stimuli are figurative, Cacciari et al.
note that “the motor component of the verb is preserved” (p. 156)
in contrast to idioms where it has vanished. In fact, when individ-
uals were asked to “rate the extent to which the idioms referred
to actions. . . the ratings were extremely low” (communication
via review) suggesting that their idiomatic stimuli were generally
not considered to be embodied. If preserving the motion compo-
nent of the verb is critical, as Cacciari et al. have claimed, then
this could account for the discrepancy between prior failures to
support the embodiment of idioms (Raposo et al., 2009; Cacciari
et al., 2011; Cacciari and Pesciarelli, 2013) and the present study
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which required participants to perform and sustain the idiomatic
movements themselves.
Another interesting avenue for future research will be to exam-
ine how typically studied features of idiomatic expressions like
decomposability and literality relate to the extent of embodiment.
Some factors like imageability will undoubtedly be highly corre-
lated with embodiment, but the nature of this relationship for
other variables is less clear and should be explored. The linguistic
features of idiomatic expressions are an important aspect of their
representation and processing, regardless of the degree of embod-
iment. In addition, since some idioms are most likely either not or
very weakly embodied, with their meaning mainly consisting of
amodal linguistic symbols (e.g., something that’s the real McCoy,
opening a Pandora’s box, to get forty winks, kick the bucket, paint
the town red, bury the hatchet, or sell someone down the river),
a pluralistic approach like Barsalou et al. (2008) Language and
Situated Simulation Theory (LASS) that integrates both linguistic
forms and sensorimotor experiences into the human concep-
tual system may be the most comprehensive and accurate way
to account for the wide range of phenomena in natural lan-
guage, including the variability regarding the embodiment of
idioms and other figurative expressions. According to this view,
language processing simultaneously triggers the activation of lin-
guistic and sensorimotor simulation systems. The activity of the
linguistic system peaks first and is responsible for categorization,
spreading activation, and other shallow, word association based
processes. The simulation system peaks later and is responsible for
deeper conceptual development, which is accomplished through
modality-specific simulations, likely involving the HMNS. It is
this deeper simulation-based processing that could result in the
stronger representations and facilitated processing for more vs.
less embodied idioms when other factors remain constant, as
suggested earlier.
In conclusion, the present findings show that the process
of embodying idioms simply by engaging in the corresponding
actions can activate their meaning enough to significantly influ-
ence subsequent processing and judgments. This study therefore
makes an important contribution to the mixed results in the lit-
erature by suggesting that the representation and processing of
idiomatic meaning may be more grounded in sensorimotor expe-
riences than previously thought, providing further support for
the fundamental importance of embodiment in language com-
prehension and cognition. Since the current research was limited
to a small number of stimuli, it will be up to future studies to
investigate a larger and more variable set of idioms to deter-
mine the reliability and validity of these results. In spite of this
limitation, it is our hope that the relatively novel approach, inter-
esting findings, and proposed account in terms of the HMNS,
will stimulate further research along these lines to more thor-
oughly understand how idioms are represented and processed,
particularly with respect to their embodiment.
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